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DOYLE HOMES, INC. v. SIGNATURE GROUP OF LIVINGSTON, INC.
 With billions of dollars at stake, copyright disputes are among the most fiercely 
argued issues in the legal world.1 A copyright is defined as “a monopoly of limited 
duration, created and wholly regulated by the legislature.”2 Once applicants obtain a 
copyright, they own the exclusive right to distribute, copy, or publish their work, and 
to prohibit others from doing the same, without prior consent.3 Despite the breadth 
of issues that copyright law covers, there is a common misconception that its only 
purpose is to protect authors against those who would appropriate their work.4 In 
actuality, the framers of the Constitution stated that the purpose of copyright law “is 
to promote the public welfare by [encouraging] the advancement of knowledge.”5 
Both Congress’s implementation of and the federal courts’ interpretations of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) have furthered this purpose.6
 The Act is at the center of these copyright disputes and has produced great 
debate.7 Part of the controversy stems from 17 U.S.C. § 411(a),8 and the two differing 
approaches that courts have developed for determining when a work is registered: (1) 
the registration approach and (2) the application approach.9 Under the registration 
approach, an applicant’s work is not considered “registered” until the Copyright 
Office approves or denies the application.10 Alternatively, under the application 
1. Copyright, Am. Libr. Ass’n, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
2. Copyright, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (quoting Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the 
Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 2 (Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 1879)); see also 
Copyrightable Works, USLegal, http://copyright.uslegal.com/copyrightable-works  (last visited Feb. 4, 
2017) (“For a work to be copyrightable, it must be an original idea that is put to use.”). Ideas, procedures, 
systems, concepts, and devices are not copyrightable. Id.
3. U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Basics 1 (2012), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf.
4. L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 
1–2 (1991). Copyright disputes can involve magazines, movies, plays, music, television broadcasts, and 
computer programs. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 2.
6. See id. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–513 (2012) (pertinent sections of the Act).
7. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201–05 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining courts’ rationale for adopting either the registration or the application approach, and 
adopting the registration approach), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 
U.S. 154 (2010); see also Thomas M. Landrigan, Note, Application or Registration?: Confusion Regarding 
the Copyright Act’s Prerequisite to Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 581, 581 (2011).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under section 
106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil action for infringement 
of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.
 Id. (footnote omitted).
9. Landrigan, supra note 7, at 581.
10. Id.; see also La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201 (finding that the submission of an application alone 
does not satisfy the requirements set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)); I’ve Submitted My Application, Fee, and 
Copy of My Work to the Copyright Office. Now What?, U.S. Copyright Office, http://www.copyright.
gov/help/faq/faq-what.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2017). The Copyright Office must determine whether 
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approach, an applicant’s work is considered “registered” once the application and fees 
are filed with the Copyright Office.11
 In Doyle Homes, Inc. v. Signature Group of Livingston, Inc., the issue before the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan was whether the application 
or the registration approach should be applied to determine when a copyright is 
considered registered.12 Had the court employed the application approach, the 
plaintiffs, Doyle Homes, Inc. and Jeffrey Doyle (“Doyle Homes”), likely would have 
been able to recover damages against the co-defendants, Kevin and Kelly Dyke (the 
“Dykes”) and Signature Group, Inc. (“Signature Group”). However, the Doyle Homes 
court employed the registration approach.13 It held that Doyle Homes failed to satisfy 
the requirements set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) because the copyright registration 
was still pending, and granted the co-defendants’ motions to dismiss.14
 This case comment contends that the Doyle Homes court incorrectly employed the 
registration approach for three reasons. First, the court erred in holding that the 
statutory language of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) was unambiguous and supported the 
registration approach.15 Second, the court placed inappropriate weight on another 
Sixth Circuit district court’s decision without properly analyzing other circuits’ 
holdings.16 Third, the court’s textual analysis was deficient because its interpretation 
did not give effect to the purpose of the Act and congressional intent. The court’s 
decision not only precluded Doyle Homes from enjoying the benefits of its work, but 
also overlooked the problems that result from employing the registration approach.
 In October 2013, the Dykes asked Doyle Homes to modify a set of architectural 
plans owned by Doyle Homes, and to estimate the cost of constructing a house on 
the Dykes’ property.17 Per the Dykes’ request, Doyle Homes modified its plans for a 
fee of $1,000.18 Later that month, the Dykes told Doyle Homes that they were “going 
in a different direction,” and its services would no longer be needed.19 Less than a 
year later, in April 2014, the Dykes hired Signature Group to build their house.20 
Soon after, Doyle Homes discovered that Signature Group was using architectural 
the material is copyrightable and meets all the legal and procedural requirements for registration before 
acting on an application. See id. It generally takes up to eight months to process an electronic application 
and up to fourteen months to process a paper application. Id.
11. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1203; Landrigan, supra note 7, at 181.
12. 69 F. Supp. 3d 674, 677 (E.D. Mich. 2014).




17. Id. at 675.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citation omitted).
20. Id.
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plans substantially similar to its plans to build the Dykes’ house.21 Doyle Homes 
alleged that any changes Signature Group made to the plans were minimal and did 
not deviate from its original plans.22
 Doyle Homes initiated this action against the co-defendants, seeking damages 
and injunctive relief for violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 10623 and 501.24 The Dykes and 
Signature Group filed separate rule 12(b)(6)25 motions to dismiss Doyle Homes’ 
claim.26 Both motions alleged that Doyle Homes did not satisfy the requirements set 
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).27 In response, Doyle Homes argued that it satisfied 
§ 411(a)’s requirements because it applied for the copyright before commencing the 
suit, and that both the Dykes’ and Signature Group’s motions were untimely.28
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, applying the 
registration approach, held that Doyle Homes failed to satisfy the requirements set 
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) and granted both the Dykes’ and Signature Group’s 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.29 In the opinion, the court noted that 
the Sixth Circuit had not settled on the registration approach or the application 
approach, and acknowledged that a circuit split existed regarding which approach 
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Section 106 states:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission.
 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
24. Section 501 states, in part: “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as 
provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a) . . . is an infringer 
of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.” Id. § 501(a); see Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d 
at 674.
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the 
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert . . . by motion:  .  .  . (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”).
26. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 674.
27. Id. at 675; see supra note 8.
28. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 675.
29. Id. at 680.
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17 U.S.C. § 411(a) fosters.30 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, relying on the plain 
language of the Act, have employed the registration approach.31 Conversely, the 
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found ambiguity in the text and, relying on 
a policy-based interpretation of the Act, have employed the application approach.32
 Before beginning its analysis, the Doyle Homes court cited another Sixth Circuit 
district court’s decision that employed the registration approach.33 In Hawaiian 
Village Computer, Inc. v. Print Management Partners, Inc., Judge Sean F. Cox opined, 
“the Sixth Circuit would favor the registration approach.”34 The Doyle Homes court 
apparently agreed with this view, by both quoting Judge Cox and citing the case 
underpinning the judge’s statement.35
 The Doyle Homes court began its analysis by examining the statutory language of 
17 U.S.C. § 411(a), holding that it is unambiguous and supports the registration 
approach.36 The provision states:
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under 
section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil action 
for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted 
until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title.37
Courts disagree as to what “registration” means and which approach it fosters.38 In a 
Ninth Circuit decision, Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, the court stated 
that 17 U.S.C. § 101 is not helpful in providing the clear meaning of “registration.”39 
30. Id. at 677.
31. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that a suit for copyright infringement cannot be brought until the copyright is registered with the 
Copyright Office), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); 
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
copyright is not registered when applicants file their application with the Copyright Office).
32. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that receipt of 
an application by the Copyright Office satisfies the registration requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)); Chi. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a copyright need not be 
registered with the Copyright Office, but instead merely filed with the Copyright Office to bring a suit 
for copyright infringement); Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that to bring a suit for copyright infringement, applicants only need to prove payment of the fee, 
deposit of the work in question, and receipt of the application by the Copyright Office).
33. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
34. 501 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (emphasis added).
35. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 677 (citing Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 
622, 630 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that registration is a prerequisite to filing a suit for copyright 
infringement), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154).
36. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 677–78, 680.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012) (footnote omitted).
38. See Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
39. 606 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2010). Registration means “a registration of a claim in the original or the 
renewed and extended term of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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The court believed that “registration” did not have a consistent meaning in the Act 
because in some sections it meant “affirmative approval by the Copyright Office,” 
whereas in others it meant “completing the process of submitting an application.”40 
The Doyle Homes court did not address the statutory definition of “registration” and 
instead used Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to define the word.41 The 
court believed that the dictionary’s definition gave “registration” a clear and consistent 
meaning throughout the Act.42
 After defining “registration,” the Doyle Homes court concluded that nothing in 17 
U.S.C. § 411(a) suggests that the filing of an application alone is sufficient to register 
a work.43 The court elaborated on this point by explaining that the phrase, “deposit, 
application, and fee required for registration” would be redundant if “registration” 
was defined according to the application approach.44 The court also stated that if an 
applicant’s delivery of the deposit, application, and fee satisfied the registration 
requirement, it would be impossible for the Copyright Office to refuse an application 
because registration already would have occurred.45
 Moreover, the Doyle Homes court stated that the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit 
opinions did not give persuasive reasons for employing the application approach.46 
The court’s critique focused on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion because it made the 
strongest arguments in favor of the application approach.47 The Doyle Homes court 
disagreed with the contentions made by the Ninth Circuit in Cosmetics Ideas,48 and 
40. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
41. The court noted the following definitions of registration: “‘an act or the fact of registering,’ ‘something 
registered,’ and ‘an entry in a register.’” Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 678 (quoting Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 1912 (1986)). Doyle Homes also noted that Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary defines “register” as “‘to record formally and exactly’ and ‘to make or secure an 
official entry of in a register.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
supra, at 1912).
42. Id. at 678–79.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 679. The application approach would produce an inconsistent meaning in the statute because the 
term “registration” in the first sentence would have the same meaning as the phrase “deposit, application, 
and fee required for registration” in the second sentence. Id. 
45. Id. The court concluded this despite a different court holding, only months earlier, that applicants may 
prove registration “by showing ‘payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt 
by the Copyright Office of a registration application.’” Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 707 (W.D. 
Va. 2014) (quoting Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984)).
46. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 678.
47. Id. at 679–80; see Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing 
the registration and the application approaches to determine Congress’s intent).
48. The Cosmetic Ideas court found the meaning of “registration” to be ambiguous because some sections of 
the Act seemed to support the registration approach, while others seemed to favor the application 
approach. 606 F.3d at 617–18. Consequently, the court turned to examine the history and purpose of the 
statute, and its context within the Act as a whole. Id.
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stated that the requirements found in 17 U.S.C. § 40849 do not support the application 
approach because it is unclear whether delivery of the deposit, application, and fee is 
meant to constitute registration.50 Further, the Doyle Homes court found that under 17 
U.S.C. § 410(a), a copyright is not registered until the Copyright Office examines the 
work and determines that it constitutes copyrightable subject matter.51 The court 
concluded its analysis by stating that the Cosmetic Ideas court also misinterpreted 17 
U.S.C. § 410(d) because its statutory language should have been found to be 
unambiguous and squarely in support of the registration approach.52
 This case comment contends that the Doyle Homes court committed three errors 
by incorrectly interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) and employing the registration approach. 
First, the court erroneously concluded that the statutory language of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 411(a) was unambiguous and supported the registration approach. In doing so, the 
court ignored the statutory definition in 17 U.S.C. § 101, and instead inappropriately 
relied on dictionary definitions.53 Second, the court incorrectly garnered support from 
a hypothetical statement from another judge in the Eastern District of Michigan, who 
stated “the Sixth Circuit would favor the registration approach” if it were to address 
the issue, rather than utilizing applicable holdings from other Circuits.54 Third, the 
court did not properly analyze the text of the Act because its interpretation did not 
give effect to the Act’s purpose and congressional intent. Further, the court’s reasoning 
precluded Doyle Homes from reaping the benefits of its work and overlooked the 
problems associated with employing the registration approach.
 First, the Doyle Homes court incorrectly held that the statutory language of 17 
U.S.C. § 411(a) was unambiguous and supported the registration approach.55 When 
49. Section 408 states, in part:
At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published or 
unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and 
during the subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of 
copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright 
claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, 
together with the application and fee specif ied by sections 409 and 708. Such 
registration is not a condition of copyright protection.
 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012).
50. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 679–80.
51. See id. at 680.
52. Id. “The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, 
which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
acceptable for registration, have all been received in the Copyright Office.” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
410(d)). Whereas the Cosmetic Ideas court stated that the language in 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) was ambiguous 
and could be read as supporting either the registration or the application approach. 606 F.3d at 618.
53. Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 678.
54. Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 680.
262
DOYLE HOMES, INC. v. SIGNATURE GROUP OF LIVINGSTON, INC.
interpreting a statute, a court must begin with the relevant text.56 To determine 
whether the statutory language is ambiguous, courts should read the words in context 
and examine their place in the overall statutory scheme.57 When a word is defined 
within a statute, courts should look to that definition to determine the meaning of 
the word.58 If a word is not defined in the statute, or the definition is not helpful, the 
noscitur a sociis canon of construction directs courts to look at the surrounding words 
in the statute to ascertain the meaning of the word.59
 Here, the Doyle Homes court did not acknowledge the statutory definition, let 
alone use it for guidance in its analysis.60 Instead, the court used Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary to define “registration.”61 According to 17 U.S.C. § 101, 
“registration” for the purpose of §§ 410(d) and 411 means “a registration of a claim in 
the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.”62 While the Act’s 
definition does not clearly define “registration,” its meaning can arguably be 
ascertained from the words surrounding it.63 In the statutory definition, the words 
“original” and “renewed,” used in concert with “registration,” show that “registration” 
aims to protect original or renewed works. The application approach aligns more 
closely with the statutory definition of “registration” because it affords applicants 
maximum protection for their original works.64 The architectural plans should have 
been afforded protection under the Act because Doyle Homes created them.65
56. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) (“If the statutory language is plain, the Court must 
enforce it according to its terms. . . . [W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, the Court must 
read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))).
57. Id. “The rule of in pari materia—like any canon of statutory construction—is a ref lection of practical 
experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a 
consistent meaning in a given context.” Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); see also 
Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2013) (“To determine a statute’s plain meaning, we not only 
look to the language itself, but also the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.” (quoting Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 
Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2013))).
58. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
59. Noscitur a sociis, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
60. See Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 678.
61. Id. (noting that the word “registration” means “‘an act or the fact of registering,’ ‘something registered,’ and ‘an 
entry in a register’” (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra note 41, at 1912)).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
63. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (stating that the meaning of some words may only 
become clear when placed in context).
64. The application approach protects applicants from the moment they file their application with the 
Copyright Office. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1203–04 
(10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). The 
registration approach does not protect applicants until the Copyright Office acts on their application. Id. 
at 1202–03. Therefore, because the application approach offers applicants protection sooner than the 
registration approach does, applicants receive the most protection under the application approach.
65. See Doyle Homes, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 675.
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 The court should have started with the statutory definition for “registration” in 
17 U.S.C. § 101. Then, if the court deemed the statutory language to be ambiguous, 
it should have looked to other methods of interpretation for guidance. Failing to 
consider the statutory definition first was a critical mistake, because if the statutory 
definition was found to be unclear, then the court would need to examine the entirety 
of the Act for guidance.66 Had the Doyle Homes court done this, it would have found 
that ambiguities exist throughout the Act regarding the meaning of “registration.”67 
For example, 17 U.S.C. § 408 states, “the owner of copyright  .  .  . may obtain 
registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the 
deposit  .  .  . , together with the application and fee  .  .  .  .”68 The statutory language 
implies that the sole requirement for obtaining “registration” is the delivery of the 
appropriate documents and fee. This meaning contradicts the one that the Doyle 
Homes court gave to “registration” under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The provision shows 
that the term “registration” does not have a clear and consistent meaning throughout 
the Act, and belies the court’s holding that the term “registration” is unambiguous.
 In Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit stated that 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) shows that the 
Act does not provide a clear definition for “registration” and does not clearly support 
either the registration approach or the application approach.69 The provision states: 
“The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an application, 
deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received 
in the Copyright Office.”70 Considering this language, because 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) 
dates a later-approved registration as the date of its application, the application, not 
the registration, is the critical event.71
 That the important date is when the application is received, not when it is acted 
on, supports the application approach.72 Although the “backdating does not occur 
until after the Copyright Office or a court has deemed the registration acceptable,” it 
should not be read as supporting the registration approach because that would put 
the applicant at a disadvantage.73 In some cases, the Copyright Office takes more 
than a year to process an application, which covers one-third of the entire statute of 
66. Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent 
Trends 2–3 (2008).
67. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 617–18 (9th Cir. 2010).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012).
69. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. “In particular, § 408 blurs the line between application and 
registration . . . .” Id. at 617.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
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limitations period to bring a civil action for infringement.74 The Doyle Homes court 
should not have discredited the Ninth Circuit’s opinion for assigning “registration” 
different meanings within the Act because the Doyle Homes court failed to see that 
inconsistencies concerning “registration” already existed within the Act.75
 Second, the Doyle Homes court incorrectly garnered support from another Sixth 
Circuit district court decision, which opined that the Sixth Circuit would favor the 
registration approach, rather than utilizing applicable holdings from other circuits.76 
In Hawaiian Village, Judge Cox’s statement, “the Sixth Circuit copyright law 
decisions would favor the registration approach,”77 is dicta and legally no more than 
mere speculation. The Hawaiian Village court failed to analyze whether the Sixth 
Circuit’s decisions would favor the registration approach.78 Instead of doing its own 
analysis, the Hawaiian Village court relied on the Murray Hill decision.79 Similarly, 
the Murray Hill court did not analyze the Sixth Circuit’s copyright decisions and 
summarily stated, “[w]ith very limited exceptions not relevant here, registration is a 
prerequisite to filing a copyright infringement suit.”80 Neither court performed its 
own analysis to determine whether the Sixth Circuit’s copyright decisions would 
favor the registration approach. Without analyzing whether the Sixth Circuit’s case 
law does in fact support the registration approach, Judge Cox’s statement, on which 
the Doyle Homes court relied, is meritless.
 The Doyle Homes court inappropriately deferred to another district court’s decision 
when it relied on Judge Cox’s statement. Although Hawaiian Village was decided in 
the same circuit, Doyle Homes was not bound by Judge Cox’s decision.81 A court must 
follow the authority of a higher court within its jurisdiction; conversely, the decision 
of a court from an equivalent or lower court in a court’s jurisdiction, or a court in 
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (“No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is 
commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”). The amount of time it takes the Copyright 
Office to process an application can be even longer than one year depending on the “number of 
applications the [Copyright] Office is receiving and clearing at the time of submission and the extent of 
questions associated with the application.” I’ve Submitted My Application, Fee, and Copy of My Work to the 
Copyright Office. Now What?, supra note 10.
75. Instead of addressing the inconsistencies in the Act, the court, using a dictionary definition, gave the 
word “registration” a uniform meaning throughout the Act. Doyle Homes, Inc. v. Signature Grp. of 
Livingston, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 674, 678 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
76. Id. at 677.
77. Hawaiian Vill. Comput., Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partners, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (E.D. Mich. 
2007) (emphasis added).
78. See generally id.
79. Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 
grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); see Hawaiian Vill., 501 F. Supp. 2d at 
954.
80. Murray Hill, 264 F.3d at 630.
81. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787, 800 (2012). 
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another jurisdiction, is merely persuasive.82 When an authority is persuasive, it does 
not bind a court, and the court can decide whether it will adhere to the authority.83
 Here, the district court’s Hawaiian Village decision and the Ninth Circuit’s 
Cosmetic Ideas decision were both merely persuasive. The Doyle Homes court should 
have deferred to a higher court’s decision from a circuit that has settled on an 
approach, because higher courts are better equipped to handle more complex legal 
issues and interpretations.84 Unlike district court cases, where one judge decides a 
case, a panel of three judges decides a circuit court case, providing an expertise that 
is more reliable.85 For this reason, the Doyle Homes court erred in relying on a Sixth 
Circuit district court decision rather than relying on a circuit court decision.
 Third, the court’s interpretion of the Act did not give effect to the Act’s purpose 
and Congress’s intent.86 The purpose of the Act “is to promote the public welfare by 
[encouraging] the advancement of knowledge.”87 The Act affords protection to 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”88 The 
registration approach contradicts the purpose of the Act because it does not afford 
applicants maximum protection or support the advancement of knowledge. Under the 
registration approach, applicants are required to wait to have their works protected.89 
Conversely, the application approach furthers the purpose of the Act because it 
protects applicants by avoiding undue delay.90
 Congress likely did not intend for applicants to be taken advantage of under the 
Act and more likely intended for applicants to receive maximum protection. By 
employing the registration approach, the Doyle Homes court lengthened the waiting 
period for registration, which allowed Signature Group to take advantage of Doyle 
Homes’ work.91 The court should have employed the application approach because it 
aligns more closely with Congress’s intent and protects applicants’ works from the 
moment their applications are filed with the Copyright Office.92 Applicants have no 
82. Barbara Bintliff, Mandatory v. Persuasive Cases, 9 Persp. 83, 83–84 (2001).
83. See id.
84. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991); Mead, supra note 81, at 800, 815. The 
circuits that have settled on employing either the registration approach or the application approach are 
the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Doyle Homes, Inc. v. Signature Grp. of 
Livingston, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 674, 677 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
85. Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 232.
86. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618–19 (9th Cir. 2010).
87. Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the intentions of the framers of the Constitution).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
89. Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849–50 (N.D. Ill. 
2013).
90. Id. at 850.
91. See Matthew J. Astle, Help! I’ve Been Infringed and I Can’t Sue!: New Approaches to Copyright Registration, 
41 U. Mem. L. Rev. 449, 482 (2011).
92. Panoramic Stock Images, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 850.
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control over the speed at which the Copyright Office processes their applications. It 
is unfair for applicants’ protections to be negatively affected by procedural delay.
 The Doyle Homes decision has policy implications that go beyond its holding. 
The court missed the “bigger picture.” Not only was Doyle Homes precluded from 
receiving the benefit of its work, but the decision also undervalued the problems that 
result from employing the registration approach. When the registration approach is 
employed, the registration process is substantially slowed for the applicant and a 
period of “legal limbo” is created.93 The registration approach incentivizes bad 
behavior, as infringing parties may continue to profit from their wrongful acts while 
applicants are stuck waiting to have their works registered.
 In contrast, the application approach avoids unnecessary delay in copyright 
infringement litigation.94 During the registration process, it is inevitable that 
applications will be subject to the Copyright Office’s scrutiny.95 Because the 
Copyright Office approves over ninety-nine per cent of the applications it receives, it 
is burdensome to require applicants to wait for its approval to satisfy the requirements 
set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).96 The wait is especially foolish since 17 U.S.C. § 
411(a) provides that even if registration has been refused, “the applicant is entitled to 
institute a civil action for infringement.”97 Regardless of whether the Copyright 
Office accepts or denies the application, courts have the ability to second-guess any 
judgment that the Copyright Office makes.98 In terms of efficiency, applicants 
should be able to sue for copyright infringement once they file their application with 
the Copyright Office.99 The registration approach is inefficient and the several courts 
that have employed it have acknowledged as much.100 The application approach 
better promotes the interests of justice and judicial economy.101
93. In this area of the law, legal limbo is a period when the applicant is awaiting action from the Copyright Office 
and cannot bring an infringement suit. See Astle, supra note 91, at 483–84; Landrigan, supra note 7, at 601–02.
94. Panoramic Stock Images, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 850.
95. James B. Astrachan, The Inevitable Registration or Refusal Approach, Daily Record (Oct. 6, 2005), 
http://thedailyrecord.com/2005/10/06/the-8216inevitable-registration-or-refusal8217-approach.
96. Astle, supra note 91, at 486–87.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
98. Astle, supra note 91, at 486–87.
99. Id. at 451–53.
100. Id. at 452; see Specific Software Sols., LLC v. Inst. of Workcomp Advisors, LLC, 615 F. Supp. 2d 708, 
715–16 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (stating that it is uneconomic to dismiss applicants’ complaints because they do 
not have a certificate of registration), abrogation recognized by Sony/ATV Music Publ’g LLC v. D.J. Miller 
Music Distribs., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-01098, 2010 WL 3872802 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2010); Brush Creek 
Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 EDL, 2002 WL 1906620, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002) 
(stating that it is inefficient to preclude an infringement suit because the application is pending), rejected by 
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 
97-3873 FMS, 1998 WL 320817, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 1998) (stating that employing the registration 
approach is inefficient and produces a “peculiar” result), rejected by Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612.
101. Tri-Mktg., Inc. v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. 09-13 (DWF/RLE), 2009 WL 1408741, at *3 
(D. Minn. May 19, 2009).
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 On a larger scale, employing the registration approach contradicts how section 
63(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Mailbox Rule”) views acceptance.102 A 
longstanding goal of the courts has been to strive for efficiency and to produce 
consistent judgments.103 If the Doyle Homes court had compared the registration 
approach to the Mailbox Rule, it would have found that a disconnect exists. 
Employing the registration approach prohibits applicants from suing for copyright 
infringement until the Copyright Office acts on their application.104 Yet, under the 
Mailbox Rule, offerees’ acceptance is operative once it leaves their possession.105 
Although the Mailbox Rule is not binding on courts dealing with copyright issues, 
the registration approach runs counter to this longstanding principle and prolongs 
the period of infringement.106 For consistency in the legal field, the application 
approach should be employed because it is more analogous to how acceptance is 
deemed operative under the Mailbox Rule.
 The Doyle Homes court incorrectly employed the registration approach because it 
failed to acknowledge the ambiguity in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), incorrectly relied on 
another Sixth Circuit district court’s decision without properly analyzing other 
circuits’ holdings, and misrepresented the purpose of the Act and Congress’s intent. 
Its decision should have provided assurances for applicants who take the necessary 
steps to safeguard their work. Instead, this decision adds another hoop for applicants 
to jump through to protect their work. When the registration process is prolonged, 
the life of the copyright infringer is made easier. The Doyle Homes decision encourages 
bad behavior and effects more than simply the outcome of this case. The court’s 
decision has set a dangerous precedent to follow, which will cause harm to a multitude 
of other applicants.
102. “Unless the offer provides otherwise, . . . an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by 
an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree’s 
possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror  .  .  .  .” Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 63(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see also Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of 
Contracts and the Common Law “Mailbox Rule,” 56 Baylor L. Rev. 175, 177 (2004) (noting that the 
common law rule that acceptance is effective when sent is known as the “mailbox rule”).
103. See generally Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure (3d ed. 2012) (noting that the adversary system of 
civil litigation is meant “to provide a fair, accurate, and efficient method of determining the likely facts 
and resolving disputes consistently, in accord with the law”).
104. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated 
on other grounds by Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). The registration approach delays 
the judicial process and causes copyright holders to wait longer than they would have to under the 
application approach. See id. at 1202–04.
105. See supra note 102.
106. Oban US, LLC v. Nautilus, Inc., No. 3:13cv1076 (JBA), 2014 WL 2854539, at *6–7 (D. Conn. June 23, 
2014).
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